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ON THE REFORM OF APPELLATE PROCEDURES
OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
BORRIS M. KOMAR*
THIS CONTRIBUTION is offered solely for the purpose of discussion,
as it is appreciated that the problems here presented may be
capable of other solutions. It is hoped that the Congress, the bench
and the bar will acknowledge the presence of the problems here
indicated, the fact that the principle of true justice requires their
solution, and that the existence of the problems unsolved is a
serious defect in the present federal judicial system.
This article will deal solely with the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court in general litigation in the federal courts.
Nothing here discussed has any reference to the original juris-
diction of that court or to jurisdiction conferred by special statutes
in special situations.
The Constitution of the United States defines the general
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court thus:
In all the other cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Ex-
ceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.'
The expression, "in all the other Cases before mentioned,"
refers to Clause I of Section 2, Article III, which reads as follows:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;
-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;-& to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;
-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;
-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State
and Citizens of another State;-between citizens of different States;
* M.A. & LL.B. (Cambridge University, England); Graduate of the Law Faculty of
the Imperial University of St. Vladimir, Russia; member of the Editorial Board of the
Comparative Law Bureau of the American Bar Association; chairman of several com-
mittees of the International Law Association, London, England; an American correspon-
dent of the International Intermediary Institute at The Hague, Holland; and a Barrister
at Law in England.
Mr. Komar has practiced international and comparative law in New York City for
many years and has appeared as counsel in court litigation for the Royal Italian and
the Royal Albanian governments. He also serves occasionally as a Special Assistant
Deputy Attorney General of New York.
1 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (Emphasis added).
28
REFORM OF APPELLATE PROCEDURES
-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants
of different States, and between a State or the Citizens thereof,
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
The founders did not intimate that only some individual
litigants should be entitled to the benefit of judicial determination
by one supreme tribunal of last resort under the authority of the
United States.
Thus, for example, Alexander Hamilton said:
Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their
true meaning and operation. The treaties of the United States, to
have any force at all, must be considered as part of the law of
the land. Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must,
like all other laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations. To
produce uniformity in these determinations, they ought to be
submitted, in the last resort, to one supreme tribunal. And this
tribunal ought to be instituted under the same authority which
forms the treaties themselves. These ingredients are both indis-
pensible.
2
The same idea was expressed in Martin v. Hunter3 where the
Supreme Court said:
This leads us to the consideration of the great question as to the
nature and extent of the appellate jurisdiction of the United States.
We have already seen that appellate jurisdiction is given by the
Constitution to the Supreme Court in all cases where it has not
original jurisdiction, subject, however, to such exceptions and
regulations as Congress may prescribe. It is, therefore, capable of
embracing every case enumerated in the Constitution.4
The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, prior to
1891 when the Circuit Courts of Appeal were created, was well
described by the Court in Forsyth v. Hammond.5
Up to the time of passage of the Act of 1891, creating the Circuit
Courts of Appeal the theory of federal jurisprudence had been a
single appellate court, to wit, the Supreme Court of the United
States, by which a final review of all cases of which the lower Fed-
eral Courts had jurisdiction was to be made. It is true there ex-
isted certain limitations upon the right of appeal and review, based
on the amount in controversy and other considerations; but such
limitations did not recognize or provide for the existence of another
appellate court, and did not conflict with the thought that this
court was to be the single tribunal for reviewing all cases and
questions of a Federal nature.6
2 Hamilton, The Federalist XXII, p. 143 (Wesleyan University Press 1961) (Emphasis
added).
3 I Wheat. 304, 4 L. Ed. 97 (1816).
4 Id. at 337, 4 L. Ed. at 105 (Emphasis added).
5 166 U.S. 506, 41 L. Ed. 1095 (1897).
6 Id. at 511-2, 41 L. Ed. at 1097-8 (Emphasis added).
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The Act of 1891, besides conferring on the Supreme Court
the power to review by certiorari "any ... case as is hereinbefore
made final in the Circuit Court of Appeals,"' also gave litigants
the absolute right to appeal to the Supreme Court in the following
instances either by petition for an appeal or by a writ of error.
In any case in which the jurisdiction of the court is in issue; in
such cases the question of jurisdiction alone shall be certified to
the Supreme Court from the court below for decision.
From the final sentences and decrees in prize cases.
In cases of conviction of a capital or otherwise infamous crime.
In any case that involves the construction or application of the
Constitution of the United States.
In any case in which the constitutionality of any law of the United
States, or the validity or construction of any treaty made under
its authority, is drawn in question.
In any case in which the constitution or law of a State is claimed
to be in contravention of the Constitution of the United States.8
It should be noted that the right of appeal applied to all
litigants9 in the federal courts irrespective of the fact of the public
importance of their litigation.
Until 1925, when this section was abolished," the number of
cases annually reviewed by the Supreme Court during the pre-











By the Act of February 13, 1925,12 Congress abolished all
appeals as of right to the Supreme Court except for appeals from
7 26 Stat. 826, c. 517.
8 Id. at § 5.
9 The term "private litigants" will hereafter be used to refer to those litigants whose
cases involve issues that do not have a "public interest" within the meaning of that term
as fixed by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.
10 Act of Feb. 13, 1925, c. 229, 43 Stat. 938.
11 Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court of the United States-
A Study in the Federal Judicial System, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 835, n. 5 (1927).
12 Supra note 10.
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decisions invalidating acts of Congress13 and direct appeals from
decisions of three judge courts. 4 Other appeals were allowed only
in the discretion of the Court on petitions for writs of certiorari.
It is interesting to note that in all the discussion of this Act
in Congress consideration was given to the heavy, delayed docket
of appeals in the Supreme Court and the overburdened tasks of
the justices thereof. 15 The duty of the Court to supply judicial
service for the country's economic life, increasing by leaps and
bounds, and its growing population, in search for justice in the
application of the existing laws, was not even hinted at. The
achievement of justice where only private litigants were concerned
was impliedly rejected.
The Act of February 13, 1925 was supplemented by Rule 38
of the Supreme Court, which, in so far as the federal courts were
concerned, provided:
5. A review or writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only where there are
special and important reasons therefor. The following, while
neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion,
indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:
b. Where a court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict
with the decision of another court of appeals on the same matter;
or has decided an important state or territorial question in a way
in conflict with applicable state or territorial law; or has decided
an important question of federal law which has not been, but
should be, settled by this Court; or has decided a federal question
in a way in conflict with applicable decisions of this Court; or has
so far departed from the accepted and usual course of the judicial
proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower
court, as to call for an exercise of this Court's power of super-
vision. 16
The Rule is misleading in its language. The words "special
and important" do not necessarily mean "of general public
interest.' 1 7 However, while issues in a litigation between private
13 Now codified in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1252 (1966).
14 Now codified in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1253 (1966).
15 Frankfurter, The Business of the Supreme Court of the United States-A Study
in the Federal Judicial System, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 53, 325, 587, 1046 (1925-26); Frankfurter
& Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court of the United States-A Study in the
Federal Judicial System, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 431, 834, 1110 (1926-27).
16 Originally Rule 38 was codified in 28 U.S.C.A. as U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 35. It is now
codified in 28 U.S.C.A. as U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 38 (1966).
17 According to Webster, Third New International Dictionary (unabr. 1964), these
words could have the following meanings:
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litigants may be of a special and important nature, it is the practice
of the Supreme Court to deny petitions for writs of certiorari
when such issues, in the opinion of the Court, do not present
matters of general public interest.
The practice was originated even before the Act of February
13, 1925. Mr. Justice Brewer said in 1906:
In this case there is no sufficient ground for a writ of certiorari.
The application comes within none of the conditions therefor
declared in the decisions of this court. However important the case
may be to the applicant, the question involved is not one of gravity
and general importance.' s
The Supreme Court again unanimously repeated this reason-
ing in Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works, Inc. 9 and
later in Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery.20 In Layne the Court stated
through Chief Justice Taft:
If it be suggested that as much effort and time as we have given to
the consideration of the alleged conflict would have enabled us to
dispose of the case before us on the merits, the answer is that it is
very important that we be consistent in not granting the writ of
certiorari except in cases involving principles, the settlement of
which is of importance to the public as distinguished from that of
the parties, and in cases where there is a real and embarrassing con-
flict of opinion and authority between the circuit courts of appeal. 21
The rule today is still more rigorous as to private litigants in
federal courts. Said Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Rice v. Sioux City
Cemetery:
A federal question raised by a petitioner (in certiorari proceeding)
may be "of substance" in the sense that, abstractly considered, it
may present an intellectually interesting and solid problem. But
Special "3a: relating to a single thing or class of things: having an individual
character or trait .. " (at p. 2186).
Important "la: marked by or possessing weight or consequence: valuable in
content or relationship. ... (at p. 1135).
General "2: involving or belonging to every member of a class, kind or
group. ... ." (at p. 944).
Public "la: of, relating to, or affecting the people as an organized commu-
nity .. " (at p. 1836).
Interest "2a: the state of being concerned or affected esp. with respect to
advantage or well being .. " (at p. 1178).
Therefore, the phrase "special and important" is not necessarily synonymous with the
phrase "general public interest" and could refer to cases where only private litigants are
concerned.
18 Fields v. United States, 205 U.S. 292, 296, 51 L. Ed. 807, 808 (1906).
19 261 U.S. 387, 67 L. Ed. 712 (1923).
20 349 U.S. 70, 99 L. Ed. 897 (1955).
21 Supra note 19, at 393, 67 L. Ed. at 714.
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this Court does not sit to satisfy a scholarly interest in such issues.
Nor does it sit for the benefit of the particular litigants.
22
In other words, cases of private or particular litigants in the
federal courts, even if they involve the questions enumerated in
Rule 38 of the Supreme Court, are excluded from the operation
of the Act of Feb. 13, 1925, if in the opinion of the Supreme Court
they do not raise issues of general public interest. The Supreme
Court will not even exercise its powers of supervision over lower
federal courts, in such excluded cases, where the lower court's
decision was wrong. Said Mr. Justice Brennan: "Very often I have
voted to deny an application (for a writ of certiorari) when I
thought that the (lower) court's result was very wrong. ' 23 Pre-
sumably, other justices voted and continue to vote simply because
the litigation was and is between private parties. Thus, the rule
permits only a single class of cases to come before the Supreme
Court. However, ". . . the Constitution has not singled out any
class (of cases) on which Congress are bound to act in preference
to others. ' 24 If the Congress cannot single out a class of cases for
special treatment, on what constitutional basis can the Supreme
Court?
The question can be stated: "Is it just to deny this opportu-
nity to private litigants in the federal courts just because in the
opinion of the Supreme Court the issues in their cases may not be
of sufficient general public interest?"
It is submitted that the main purpose of any judicial system
should be to seek justice in every case that comes up for disposition
by its courts. By "justice" is meant correct application of the
existing law to the facts in issue in the case and not abstract or
ethical justice. It is believed that this primary duty of the courts
cannot be and should not be subjected to the limitation of the
general public interest rule.
It is not the duty of a private litigant to spend funds and
efforts on litigation having general public interest. The duties of
22 Supra note 20, at 74, 99 L. Ed. at 901.
23 Brennan, Supreme Court Review of State Court Decisions, 38 Mich. St. B. J. No.
11, 14, 18 (1959).
24 Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, 320, 4 L. Ed. 97, 103 (1816).
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a private litigant are fully performed when he conducts litigation
solely for his private interest.
Is it just to deny an appeal to a private litigant when the lower
court may have departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings merely because the issues in his case do not
involve questions of general public interest? Is it just in the case
of a private litigant to let stand a decision of a circuit court of
appeals in conflict with a decision or decisions of another or other
courts of appeals on the same matter, merely because the ques-
tions of general public interest are absent? Is it just to foreclose a
review of an erroneous decision on an important question of state
or territorial law, merely because said decision was made in a
litigation between private parties? Is it just to leave unsettled an
important question of federal law just because the decision of that
question will affect only private litigants in a federal court and is
unlikely to arise in general litigation at a later time? Is it just to
subject private parties in a federal court to any decision which is
in conflict with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court merely
because its wrongfulness affects one particular case and not the
general public?
These are important questions in view of the small percentage
of writs for certiorari that are granted. The rejection en masse of
petitions of private litigants for writs of certiorari may account















25 Douglas, The Supreme Court and Its Case Load, 45 Cornell L.Q. 401, 409 (1960).
Note annual reviews of the work of the United States Supreme Court in the Harvard
Law Review.
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Nevertheless, the appellate docket of the Supreme Court has
remained at 1172 cases in 1965 as compared with 1200 cases in
1915-25,26 despite the enormous increase in business activity and
in the population of this country.
This author does not believe that these statistics are in con-
formity with the sole purpose for the existence of the courts-to
serve and aid the people in their quest for justice. Congress, in
passing the Act of Feb. 13, 1925, assumed the inviolability of the
present structure of the Supreme Court and sought to relieve the
overburdened justices in complete disregard of the interests of
the people of the United States as represented by the litigants in
the federal courts. A review of about fifteen percent of the thou-
sands of petitions for writs of certiorari filed annually in the
Supreme Court does not answer the chief appellate needs of the
present generation of litigants in the federal courts.
Are there any means whereby the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court may be broadened without overburdening its
judicial and administrative machinery?
This author has two suggestions.
It is recognized that the Constitution of the United States
expressly provides for only one Supreme Court.27 But in so far as
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is concerned, the
Constitution expressly provides that it should be exercised by the
Supreme Court "under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make.128 This clause has been uniformly held to confer on the
Congress wide powers to regulate not only the number of justices
and the procedure of the Supreme Court, but also its jurisdiction
in appellate practice. The clause was enacted "to enable Congress
to regulate and restrain the appellate power, as the public interest
might, from time to time require. '" 29 Therefore, the appellate
powers of the Supreme Court are given by the Constitution but
are limited by the Judicial Act and other Acts passed by Con-
gress." In Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger,31 it was stated
26 Id. at 409.
27 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
28 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
29 Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, 4 L. Ed. 97 (1816).
30 Durousseau v. United States, 6 Cranch 307, 3 L. Ed. 232 (1814).
31 348 U.S. 176, 99 L. Ed. 233 (1955).
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that "Congress is in a position to weigh the competing interests
of the dockets of the trial and appellate courts, to consider the
practicability of savings in time and expense, and to give proper
weight to the effect on the litigants.
' 32
This author suggests the following as a possible solution. A
new statute should be passed by Congress, enlarging the number
of the Supreme Court Justices to seventeen, fixing the quorum of
the Supreme Court for all and any of its official duties at five
Justices and authorizing it to function either jointly or severally in
one or more divisions designated by the Chief Justice. The Chief
Justice should then designate three divisions of the Supreme Court
and the Justices to preside in them for each term. The Chief
Justice should also assign business to each division. For example:
Division One-all cases of original jurisdiction and appellate
cases of general public interest; Division Two-all cases of crim-
inal law and all appeals involving administrative rulings of exec-
utive governmental bodies; and Division Three-all other appel-
late cases. Divisions Two and Three, either on their own motions
or on the application of any party to an appeal, may transfer any
appeal to Division One because of a finding of general public
interest. The Chief Justice may also assign more than five Justices
to hear cases of great national importance.
In this manner the Supreme Court would have almost twice
the present manpower to deal with its dockets and to meet its
responsibility to the tremendous rise of the country's business
activity and its increase in population.
There still remains the further question of whether or not
the present method of appeal by writ of certiorari should continue
to be regulated by the discretion of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court, of course, should continue to exercise
such discretion. However, it is urged that the class of cases in
which litigants in the federal courts may appeal as a matter of right
be increased. The right of appeal is a valuable and important
right which should not depend entirely on an unknown manner
of dispensation secretly administered." The Supreme Court
82 Id. at 181, 99 L. Ed. at 238.
3a ". . . [Tihe objective standards governing the exercise of discretion may unwit-
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should have the courage to admit that in certain instances an
appeal to it should always be proper and desirable to assure a
just result and provide a true administration of justice. Besides,
the Supreme Court has many means at its disposal to keep its
dockets down and undeserving appeals out, such as motions to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, for absence of a federal question,
for designating a ground unsupported by facts, for lack of merit
as covered by prior decisions or on other grounds.34
It is therefore proposed that appeals as of right be permitted
by statute to litigants in the federal courts in all cases:
1. Where an issue is timely and duly raised as to the denial of any
right protected by the Constitution of the United States;
2. Where the decision of the federal court below is arrived at by
a divided court;
8 5
3. Where the federal court below has decided a federal question
in a way in conflict with applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court;
4. Where a federal court below has rendered a decision in conflict
with the decisions of any other federal appellate court on the
same matter;
5. Where the federal court below has departed from the accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings. 36
This first suggested solution may satisfactorily solve the prob-
lem presented in this article; however, an alternate solution such
as follows may be just as feasible. All petitions for writs of certio-
rari to the Supreme Court could be abolished, except as to applica-
tions relating to the decisions of state courts. Instead, in the in-
stances just recommended for granting an absolute right of appeal,
a statute should grant a right to a rehearing in the federal court
of appeals en banc within the circuit.37 Within fifteen days after
tingly fail in numerous instances." Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme
Court of the United States-A Study in the Federal Judicial System, 40 Harv. L. Rev.
834, 866 (1927).
34 See, e.g., Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court Practice (3d ed. 1962).
35 Compare section 6 of the Act of April 29, 1802 entitled an "Act to Amend the
Judicial System of the United States" in force for over half of a century.
36 While appeals from the state courts are not considered here, the statute should
add to the appeals as of right those where Supreme Court Rule 38 now permits applica-
tions for writs of certiorari.
37 The Supreme Court now sometimes returns appealed cases to the courts of appeals
for rehearing en banc. United States ex rel. Robinson v. Johnaston, 316 U.S. 649, 86 L.
Ed. 478 (1942); Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. American Air Transport, Inc., 344 U.S. 4, 97
L. Ed. 4 (1952). See 28 U.S.C.A. § 46(c) & (d).
The following quotation of the Court is also pertinent here:
Hence, insofar as possible, determinations en banc are indicated whenever it
seems likely that a majority of all the active judges would reach a different result
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filing a notice of rehearing to the court en banc either party to such
notice may move in such appellate court for leave to appeal instead
to the Supreme Court on the ground that the issues in the appeal
are of general public interest. On the denial of such a motion by
the federal appellate court, a similar application could be made
in the Supreme Court. The denial of these applications would
not affect the right to a rehearing in the appellate court en banc,
but no appeal would lie in any case to the Supreme Court from
the decision of the federal court of appeals en banc. The grant
of the motion to appeal to the Supreme Court would terminate the
right to a rehearing in the federal court of appeals en banc.
In this manner, the Supreme Court would be relieved of the
consideration of the thousands of petitions for writs of certiorari
now filed with it, and the litigants would have a statutory right of
double appeal equally with those more fortunate of them who
would be allowed an appeal to the Supreme Court. Of course, the
grounds for appeals to the Supreme Court from the decisions of
the highest state courts canot apply to this appellate system. On
the other hand, there may have to be an increase in the number of
circuit appeal judges and provisions made for special sessions of
the courts of appeals en banc.
The present method of allowing appeals to the Supreme
Court only in cases involving, in its opinion, questions of general
public interest results in only some litigants enjoying the benefit
of two appeals granted to all litigants and the people of the United
States by the Federal Constitution. Is it proper to grant or deny
this important and valuable right to one class of litigants and deny
it to another in the mere unfathomed discretion of the Court?
Whatever solution may be finally found, it is hoped that interest
has been aroused in proper congressional and judicial circles in
the need for reform in the present appellate procedures of the
Supreme Court.
than the panel assigned to hear a case or which has heard it. Hearings en banc
may be a result also in cases extraordinary in scale-either because the amount
involved is stupendous or because the issues are intricate enough to invoke the
pooled wisdom of the circuit. Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co.,
345 U.S. 247, 270, 97 L. Ed. 986, 997 (1953).
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